People often face situations of internal tension and stress. A person reacts to any discomfort in two ways: by building coping strategies and using psychological defenses. Coping strategies are methods of activity that help to adapt to a difficult situation and maintain psychological balance.

Where did the term come from?

Coping strategies are everything that helps a person overcome stress. A stressful situation is characterized by anxiety, complexity, and uncertainty. Coping strategies provide an opportunity to cope with a difficult problem. The strategy can be emotional or behavioral. The Russian psychological school uses the concept of “experience” or coping behavior. The essence of coping is to enable a person to overcome life’s difficulties or reduce their impact on the body.

The term appeared in psychology in the early sixties of the last century. It was used by L. Murphy; he used it to describe how to overcome childhood developmental crises. A few years later, cognitive psychologist Richard Lazarus described strategies for coping with stressors in his book.

Classification of strategies

There are several classifications of coping strategies. The most famous classification of coping strategies is Lazarus. In collaboration with S. Folkman, two types of coping strategies were proposed:

• problem-oriented;
• emotionally oriented.

In the first case, a person, while experiencing stress, tries to change the situation by understanding the problem; he is looking for information on how to act and what to do. Such comprehension helps to avoid rash actions and impulsive actions.

The emotional type of coping behavior in stressful situations includes thoughts that help reduce the psychological pressure from a tense state. Thoughts help you feel better, but are not aimed at solving the problem. Examples: humor, use of alcohol, tranquilizers, denial of the situation.

Problem-oriented coping strategies

In the work of Lazarus and Folkman, there are eight coping strategies. A person may have a different strategy for helping himself. These include:

1. Planning actions to solve the problem, analyzing the situation, various efforts made to get out of the problem.
2. Confrontational coping. Attempts to resolve a difficult situation through confrontation. The problem is resolved through hostility and conflict; there are difficulties in planning actions. A person may not realize the consequences of unjustified persistence. Confrontation is often seen as maladaptive, but the individual shows persistence in defending his own interests, and the person actively confronts difficulties.
3. Taking responsibility for the problem. After assessing one’s role, attempts are made to correct the tense situation.
4. Self-control. A person controls his emotions and actions.
5. Positive assessment of a stressful problem. In this case, there is a search for the advantages of the current situation.
6. Appeal to the help of others and loved ones.
7. Distancing. A strategy of moving away from a situation, reducing its significance.
8. Avoiding a problem, running away from difficulties.

Lazarus showed that it is the person who evaluates the situation as stressful or not. Only he can independently assess the magnitude of the potential stressor. In every difficult situation, a person himself determines coping resources to cope with stress.

Basic strategy and resources

Richard Lazarus defined coping mechanisms as the actions that an individual takes in a situation of threat, illness, physical violence, etc. There is a theory of coping behavior that identifies the main types of coping strategies and resources. The basic strategy is:

• problem solving;
• avoidance;
• search for support.

Basic coping resources are:

• Self-concept;
• empathy;
• affiliation;
• locus of control;
• cognitive resources.

The positive nature of the self-concept allows a person to be confident that he is able to keep a tense situation under control. Empathy allows you to accept another person’s point of view and use it to develop more solutions. Affiliation is a tool for interpersonal contacts that helps regulate emotional and friendly support.

Coping mechanisms play a compensatory function; they contribute without much harm to the individual.

Coping behavior

Coping refers primarily to adaptation during a stressful experience. In psychology, this is the desire to solve a problem for good health.

The theory of coping behavior is the ability of an individual to maintain a balance between the environment and resources. The main purpose of coping behavior is to maintain a person’s psychological well-being. For mental health, the necessary coping mechanism strategy is selected.

In the theory of coping behavior, there are unproductive coping strategies. These include coping behavior in a stressful situation by avoiding the problem and inability to get out of it with dignity.

There are also productive coping behaviors under stress. It is important to work on the problem, keep in touch with other people, and remain optimistic.

Diagnostic technique for determining strategies

The diagnostic technique was developed by Amirkhan; he identified three groups of coping mechanisms. This is problem solving, seeking social help, avoidance.

Using all three strategies will be effective. In some situations, a person is able to cope with the problem on his own; in other cases, he will need help. Sometimes he can avoid difficulties only by thinking about the adverse consequences of his actions.

The indicator of coping strategies takes into account all coping mechanisms. Thus, coping behavior can be defined as developing a plan and taking actions in the event of a psychological threat. Coping styles and strategies belong to the sphere of conscious behavior, with the help of which a person copes with life’s problems.

The questionnaire is one of the best tools for studying important processes in human stress behavior. You can complete the questionnaire yourself or with the help of a psychologist. With the help of the technique, the coping strategies of the individual are realized. You can find out your style of behavior under stress using the diagnostic technique “Indicator of coping strategies”.

Video: lecture by Alexey Shchavelev “Stress Management”

Today I want to present to you an article by a wonderful psychologist, Lyudmila Ponomareva, about coping strategies and their role in the fight against stress.Choosing an adequate coping strategy is important in order to successfully cope with stress, and knowing the types of strategies is useful in order to see the full range of tools available to us.

A young girl was walking along the embankment with her friend, who was an old sailor.
Not everything was smooth in the girl’s life, she was tormented by some of her own life problems, and she walked, immersed in these worries.
Naturally, the friend noticed the girl’s feelings. He asked her:
- Do you think that if I fell into the water now, I would definitely drown?
The girl leaned over the railing and looked down at the raging cold waves.
- Of course you would drown! - she said.
But the sailor objected:
- I doubt! I have never in my life seen anyone drown just because they were in the water.
- Look how strong the waves are! - said the girl. - Even if you stay alive, you will definitely end up in the hospital with hypothermia.
“Only if I stay in the water for too long,” her friend continued. - I'm a sailor! I've fallen in the water many times, so I know exactly what I'm talking about. When I fell for the first time, I was terribly scared. But then I realized that I was in no danger if I quickly got back out.
The same is true with your problems! - the friend addressed the girl affectionately. - Instead of sighing and tormenting, you better think about how you can get out of all this as quickly as possible!
More often than not, the problem is not the problem itself, but the way we perceive it.”

This is a fairly well-known parable. The clear message is clear to everyone: what is perceived as “a piece of cake” for one person can be a disaster for another. If we go further and turn to the concept of stress, we see a very important thing. To learn to use the resources of stress resistance, you need to get away from those stereotypical thoughts and actions that we often use out of habit, but which are obviously or not obviously ineffective.

What is “coping”?

In psychology, coping refers to precisely those thoughts and actions that a stressful situation causes in us. Under the influence of our usual coping strategies, we seek or fail to seek resources to combat stress, use them or not use them. Thus, a person may know a lot about how to maintain his health and not become a “victim” of a stalemate, but cannot use his knowledge.

How are coping strategies formed?

Every second a person learns to interact with the world. He is taught certain rules of behavior in certain situations; they can be embedded in culture and be shaped by personal experience. The choice of strategies for interacting with stressful situations depends on the resources that a person has: knowledge, health, social support, etc.

What are the types of coping strategies?

When a stressful situation arises, we begin to think - feel - act. Therefore, there are similar coping strategies - cognitive, emotional strategies, behavioral. There are many classifications of coping in the scientific literature, but all of them, in one way or another, relate to these three areas.

For example, a person, finding himself in a difficult situation, can take an active, problem-oriented position: study the situation, seek social support.

A person can also choose a type of coping with stress in which he will not interact with the situation, but will only reduce the physiological response to stress. The person will begin to take alcohol, drugs, overeat, sleep a lot or refuse sleep, overload himself with hard work, etc.

Based on the cognitive component, a person can choose cognitive strategies aimed at the situation: thinking through the situation (analysis of alternatives, creating an action plan); developing a new perspective on the situation; acceptance of the situation; distraction from the situation.

Or choose fantasies about how he will cope with stress.

Or try to consciously change your attitude towards the situation. This position is well illustrated by the phrase: “If you cannot change the situation, then change your attitude towards it.”

In terms of emotions, a person can choose to either express emotions or suppress them. “Real men don’t cry” is a classic coping strategy, shaped by culture.

According to R. Lazarus, there are 8 types of coping with stress:

"Confrontation. Resolving a problem through not always targeted behavioral activity or the implementation of specific actions. Often the strategy of confrontation is considered as non-adaptive, but when used in moderation, it ensures the individual’s ability to resist difficulties, energy and enterprise in resolving problem situations, and the ability to defend one’s own interests;

Distancing. Overcoming negative experiences in connection with a problem by subjectively reducing its significance and the degree of emotional involvement in it. Characteristic is the use of intellectual techniques of rationalization, switching attention, detachment, humor, devaluation, etc.;

Self-control. Overcoming negative experiences in connection with the problem through targeted suppression and containment of emotions, minimizing their influence on the perception of the situation and the choice of behavioral strategy, high control of behavior, the desire for self-control;

Seeking social support. Resolving the problem by attracting external (social) resources, searching for informational, emotional and effective support. Characterized by a focus on interaction with other people, expectation of support, attention, advice, sympathy, specific effective help;

Taking responsibility. Recognition by the subject of his role in the emergence of the problem and responsibility for its solution, in some cases with a distinct component of self-criticism and self-accusation. The expression of this strategy in behavior can lead to unjustified self-criticism and self-flagellation, feelings of guilt and chronic dissatisfaction with oneself;

Escape-avoidance. An individual’s overcoming of negative experiences due to difficulties through an evasion-type response: denial of the problem, fantasizing, unjustified expectations, distraction, etc. With a clear preference for the avoidance strategy, infantile forms of behavior in stressful situations may be observed;

Planning to solve a problem. Overcoming a problem through a targeted analysis of the situation and possible behavior options, developing a strategy for resolving the problem, planning one’s own actions taking into account objective conditions, past experience and available resources;

Positive revaluation. Overcoming negative experiences in connection with a problem by reframing it positively, viewing it as a stimulus for personal growth. Characterized by a focus on transpersonal, philosophical understanding of the problem situation, its inclusion in the broader context of the individual’s work on self-development.”

I would like to emphasize once again that we often choose certain strategies for perceiving and responding to a situation stereotypically and automatically, without thinking, because we are used to it or have learned it this way. At the same time, we do not take into account the fact that our behavior may be ineffective.

It turns out that there are effective and ineffective coping strategies? Why then do we continue to use them?

Yes, coping strategies come with a plus and a minus sign. Productive coping strategies are those that are aimed at solving a problem, do not reduce the level of health, and do not lead to social maladjustment. Unproductive ones are antagonists of productive strategies, i.e. lead to deterioration of health, decreased activity and social adaptation due to stress. We continue or use for various reasons:

1. This behavior has produced positive changes in the past. Several times the person managed to cope with stress. However, conditions have changed and this type of behavior is now unproductive. But due to past experience, a person continues to use it.

2. Parental experience. Roughly speaking, that’s how they taught it. Often parents tell their children “hit back” – coping with interaction with the situation, or “don’t touch him, don’t get your hands dirty” – coping with avoidance. At the same time, the child may have completely different feelings in relation to the situation, but he learns to regulate himself in accordance with the learned rules of behavior

3. Social experience. The society we live in dictates how we should behave. Existing clichés are not always effective in stress resistance. For example, a man should always react aggressively to a stressful situation.

4. Personal experience. These are the patterns of behavior and reactions that were formed by a person in the process of life.

5. Availability of resources, personal and social characteristics. This includes self-esteem, self-acceptance, locus of control and level of anxiety, self-efficacy resources, gender and age, and membership in a particular social group.

How can I understand that I am not managing stress effectively and what should I do about it?

Often a person himself feels that when he finds himself in difficult situations, he cannot get out of them. Life changes for the worse. At an appointment with a psychologist, they complain of depressive thoughts, deteriorating health, as if they were “running in a vicious circle.” If you feel something like this:

a) it is necessary to find out which coping strategies you use most often and how effective they are;

b) increase resources to combat stress;

c) force targeted behavioral changes: the use of new behavioral strategies, the use of resources, training and psychotherapy.

Lazarus test*

· Certain coping strategies can be effective or ineffective depending on the situation. You yourself can evaluate how productive this type of behavior is for you.

Nartova-Bochaver S.K. “CopingBehavior” in the system of concepts of personality psychology. Psychological Journal, vol. 18, no. 5, 1997.

Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal and coping. New York, Springer.
http://psylist.net/praktikum/00298.htm

A cunning escape from a dangerous situation and, what is important, timely: stratagems No. 9, 11, 21, 36.

Stratagem No. 9

[As if not participating] watch the fire on the opposite bank

“Sitting on the mountain, they watch the fight of the tigers.” First of all, do not interfere in a crisis situation in which your opponent is, when you yourself are weak, for example, so as not to be drawn into a crisis situation yourself, and later, when it develops in your favor, you do not have to collect all the fruits alone, fallen from the sky (Chen 2, S. 93). The stratagem is a hybrid; it occupies an intermediate place between the stratagem of flight and the stratagem of profit.

Stratagem of non-intervention; stratagem of waiting, stratagem of delayed response.

Stratagem range

In professional life, situations are possible when three people - A, B and C - strive for the same goal. A and B have approximately the same qualifications for this, B is somewhat less prepared and, strictly speaking, has no chance. A serious rivalry breaks out between A and B. B takes this calmly and does not interfere. Meanwhile, shreds are flying between A and B. In the end, A and B were exhausted and discredited themselves as a result of their arguments. So who achieves the goal? Weak B, not because of his qualifications, but because, thanks to stratagem No. 9, he never showed himself on the negative side (Chen 2, S. 93). In European and Chinese life, this stratagem is used by people who are reproached for lack of civic courage. They do not take part in the bad deeds that are playing out before their eyes in order to remain unpunished.

Stratagem Prevention

Internal difficulties should not be thoughtlessly brought to public attention, so that everyone can see how the “flame” is blazing, and opponents are given the chance to “use the fire for robbery,” that is, to apply stratagem No. 5.

Anyone who, without participating, “watches the fire on the opposite bank,” will probably, when the fire suddenly spreads to his own bank, grieve because of his passivity. Therefore, simple observation is completely insufficient. Additional protective measures must be taken.

Example

Build ships during drought

In ancient China, there were common sayings such as: “If there is a drought, they build ships; they are building carts in anticipation of the flood.” Ordinary commercial logic requires just the opposite, namely, to build carts during a drought, and ships during a flood, since during a drought, carts are needed, and during a flood, ships. The quoted proposal, which takes into account the undulating movements of the market, represents, however, a distant prospect, since “the stupid earns today, the smart earns tomorrow” (Zhang, S. 44). You need to look beyond the immediate market position, to the opposite bank and the “fire” of future needs burning there, and take appropriate strategic commercial actions. Since the drought and flood are sure to pass, those who produced only wagons for drought and only ships for flood will then be disappointed. His business, which was profitable for a short time, will turn out to be a fleeting success. However, those who prepared in advance to produce the goods needed by customers after the drought and after the flood will earn a lot of money.

Stratagem No. 11

Let the plum dry instead of the peach

They save their own skin or the skin of another by exposing the head of a third. Someone is used (with or without his consent, informed or not) as a pawn and sacrificed. A minor figure is removed to save the main one. To absolve yourself of responsibility for problems, you can blame it on fictitious objects or circumstances, such as “burden of tradition”, “zeitgeist”, “globalization”, “objective necessity”, “negative press”, “market”, “ trait”, “stars”, etc. Chinese civil servants explain their mistakes by bureaucracy, that is, they are not personally to blame, but a general, specifically indescribable shortcoming (Arbeiter-Tageszeitung, Beijing, 1988, 09.02, S. 2).

Scapegoat/innocent victim stratagem.

In a more abstract sense, this stratagem is aimed at then, changing towards the profit-making stratagem and taking on a hybrid character, to obtain significant profits, incurring relatively small losses, sacrificing the unimportant and providing the important; sacrificing a tactical advantage to win a strategic trump card; give a part to save the whole.

Pawn sacrifice/queen sacrifice stratagem.

Stratagem range

The method of using this stratagem is to limit wrong behavior solely to individual responsible individuals. Thus, it is necessary to prevent the diffusion of responsibility, when blame is assigned not only to certain individuals, but also to their superiors, and incorrect behavior is explained by structural and organizational shortcomings of the enterprise. After the Chinese “cultural revolution” (1966-1976), the so-called “four” were brought to justice for all crimes committed during this period. This could have saved the reputation of Mao Zedong, who unleashed the “cultural revolution.” In the People's Republic of China, during criticism, they zealously ensure that only “individuals” or “individual phenomena (gebe xianxiang)” are exposed, and not the political system.

Although the Pope apologized for the past crimes of Catholics, he held individual Christians responsible. So he wanted to ensure that the church as a whole, not guilty of “the sinful behavior of its members” (NZZ, 2000, 11.08, p. 54), could remain untainted and continue to shine with a bright light. A similar argument was made by representatives of the accounting firm Andersen during the Enron scandal, that “the misbehavior of individual members in the Houston office (where documents were mainly destroyed) does not justify criminal prosecution of the entire firm” (NZZ, 2002, 15.03, S. 21). .

The entire foreign trade policy of the People's Republic of China was explained to the Chinese public immediately at the beginning of the so-called opening phase of 1978/79, when Stratagem No. 11 was strategically applied, even if it (the stratagem) was not clearly named. They used Lenin's quotes related to the Soviet "new economic policy", according to which the economy could not be restored without technical assistance from capitalist countries. Agreements with capitalists must be subject to precise control, and in order to receive foreign assistance, capitalists must make a profit - and all this with one goal - to acquire, in the end, a clear final advantage, namely a strong Soviet national economy (Strategeme 1, 11.18) .

During the 1954 FIFA World Cup in Bern, Sepp Herberger left seven of his first team players in the stands in the group game against Hungary. The Hungarians pacified the “reserve team” with a score of 8:3. True, Germany thus lost miserably. However, then in the semi-final the Germans were in better shape than the Austrians, tired from the match with Switzerland (7:5), they won 6:1 and reached a memorable final against the Hungarians (NZZ, 2003, 07.11, S. 58).

Stratagem Prevention

From the very beginning, you need to avoid getting into a situation where you are responsible for the actions of others with your head, or you need to get out of it in time. Shifting responsibility to individuals is prevented through careful global analysis.

Risk when using a stratagem

“One study shows that managers are rarely self-critical and constantly act like a Teflon frying pan: nothing should stick to them. It is always others who are to blame. Shifting the blame to external factors is, of course, understandable as a human being, but it is fatal when attempting to rescue” (Handelsblatt, 2003, 22-23.08). Anyone who admits that one can only be saved with the help of stratagem No. 11 is venturing too much. He risks not finding the “plum”. If you frantically look for scapegoats, instead of making an honest analysis of the situation and being prepared to solve problems, then you yourself can find yourself on the sidelines. Why, however, sometimes not skillfully play the role of a whipping boy (see stratagem No. 34 about this)?

Examples

Iacocca plums

From the Chinese point of view, the brilliant use of stratagem No. 11 was by Lee Iacocca (1924-1999), the man whose activities began the public cult of famous and successful CEOs in the United States. In 1979, he was named chairman and CEO of Chrysler Motor Corporation. In subsequent years, he carried out “one of the largest turnaround efforts in the history of the automobile industry” (CM, S. 1323). Among other things, he introduced tough austerity measures, eliminated excess inventories and carried out mass layoffs. These were the “plums” that were sacrificed (Yu 1994, S. 83 f.). Thanks to this, he saved the “peach” in the form of a concern entrusted to him, which already in 1983 brought a profit of $900 million.

100 thousand pairs of lost shoes

In 1984, Mr. Sato, a member of the board of a Japanese commercial company, bought 100 thousand pairs of shoes, impeccable in all respects, from a Chinese shoe factory and sent them to Japan. But the shoes didn't fit his customers, and his company was left with unsold inventory. Sato then personally went to China and asked the Chinese firm for help. A week later, she told him that she would replace 100 thousand pairs of old shoes with 100 thousand pairs of shoes with a new design. Satisfied, Sato returned to Japan. The promised shoes arrived on time. In its PR campaigns for new shoes, the Japanese company emphasized the excellent service of the Chinese shoe factory. This time the Chinese shoes were a success. The following year, the Japanese ordered 300 thousand pairs, and in 1988 even 1.5 million pairs of shoes. According to the Chinese commentary, this was a successful use of stratagem No. 11: “The factory sent 100 thousand pairs to eventually sell a million pairs” (Yu 1994, p. 84).

Generous buyer of soybeans

Once, while trading soybeans, seller A started with a price of 150 dollars. for 1 ton, and buyer B - from an offer of 136 dollars. per ton. In the end A agreed to $145. Meanwhile, B did not want to pay more than $140 under any circumstances. So they parted with nothing. Three days later, A suddenly encountered payment problems. He really wanted to quickly agree on a sale with B. Then A called B and offered him soybeans for $140. per ton. During the new negotiations, A spoke quite openly about his financial problems. After careful consideration, B later announced that he wanted to buy soybeans at a price of $145. per ton. A's joy and surprise knew no bounds. Later, one of the responsible employees asked B why he paid a large amount. In response, it was said that it was only about 3,000 tons, that is, a loss of 15 thousand dollars - a trifle for B. However, this sacrifice could be invaluable for future relations with the soybean supplier. Indeed, from then on both companies worked closely together, and B began to enjoy “special treatment and privileges. Loss in one day is 15 thousand dollars. could not be compared with the long-term profits obtained as a result” (Yu 1994, p. 90 f.).

Rules for negotiating in the shade of a plum tree

If they are already making concessions, that is, sacrificing plums, then at the beginning of negotiations - in no case regarding important points.

A single concession, that is, one plum, should not be too large. It is recommended to make concessions little by little. The plum should not be sacrificed easily, quickly and silently, but rather one should fight for every plum given and demand compensation for it. Here and there you can also make false sacrifices, that is, make supposed concessions that cost you nothing. Don't lose sight of the last concession to be placed on the table, as it will be the most important!

Stratagem No. 21

Cicada sheds its golden skin

The cicada is freed from its now narrow monster shell, which glitters in the sun like gold, and disappears unnoticed into the distance as the pursuer's attention is concentrated on the golden skin left behind. As a rule, a stratagem is used to escape from danger (Zhou 1992, p. 61). The stratagem first describes a special type of “leaving” in the sense of stratagem No. 36 (Lin, S. 30). In this understanding, this stratagem refers to the stratagems of flight. But metamorphosis can also serve other purposes (Yu 2003, p. 122), for example, preparation for the implementation of stratagem No. 1 “Deceiving the sky, crossing the sea” (for example, a spy disguises himself as a businessman or a policeman disguises himself as a drug buyer). In business, a stratagem can also be used offensively, say, to improve market position (Lin, S. 30).

The stratagem formula can have two interpretations.

1. With the help of an imaginary image, such as a simple sentence (“I’ll go to the toilet”), or an invented, artistically designed sample of a product, they distract the opponent’s attention from the person fleeing. Escape must be understood not only in a physical sense, but also in an abstract sense. This is how the Chinese explain certain methods of exemption from liability as an application of this stratagem. Flight stratagem.

2. The cicada sheds its skin to move into another form of existence and conquer a new space for its actions.

Stratagem of image change/stratagem of metamorphosis.

Stratagem range

Stratagem of care

In the 1930s Shanghai speculator Zhao proposes to banker Du to found a consortium to trade extremely unreliable government loans. Within two days, Zhao needed $4 million. in cash. Banker Du thinks: “The guy is afraid. He miscalculated in his speculations. Now he is trembling before the approaching deadline for settlement with the stock exchange.” Through his proposed consortium, Zhao is trying to distract creditors to whom he cannot repay money and negotiate with them to delay payment of the debt. So they will think that whoever was able to create such a huge consortium is solvent at any time. Therefore, they will not impatiently and to the day collect debts, but will be encouraged. This way, Zhao will be able to initially avoid his immediate payment obligations. Maybe Zhao wants to use the stratagem “The cicada sheds its golden skin”? The banker clearly attributes Zhao's behavior to stratagem No. 21 in his assumptions. Confirmation of this evidence of the high degree of sensitivity to cunning among Chinese merchants can be read in one novel authored by Mao Dun (1896-1981) 48.

Stratagem No. 21 can also be implemented through clever excuses. “We are, after all, just people, not machines! So mistakes can happen." Thus, someone who has failed at something can cleverly avoid criticism. Further, stratagem No. 21 is used as an excuse when criticism is directed at you. At the same time, they openly declare something of secondary importance in order to shift attention to it. As a result, time is gained to eliminate evidence regarding aggravating circumstances (Yu 1993, S. 204).

In large organizations, responsibilities can be so finely distributed and delegated to different levels that everyone in a long line of vague responsibilities must pass through the cells of the legal sieve (NZZ, 2004, 26.03, S. 19).

Metamorphosis Stratagem

Chinese cabaret artist Wang Ji performed a sketch on China Central Television's New Year's program broadcast throughout the country, the subject of which was unfair advertising. As an example, he chose PR campaigns for an imaginary brand of Universum cigarettes. Aired during the best time of the year, the sketch was a huge success. Wang Zhengzhen, director of a tobacco factory in Heilongjiang Province, did not laugh, but became thoughtful. Although the cabaret artist criticized Universum cigarettes, now everyone was talking about these fictional cigarettes. Van wanted to capitalize on this! He immediately organized a working group at his factory that began producing Universum brand cigarettes. The same year it appeared on the market and was in great demand. To increase it, Wang included the cabaret artist himself in the advertising and continually improved the quality of the products. It has gained a strong position in the tough Chinese cigarette market. The above-mentioned factory had previously produced one brand of cigarettes, but it was just a “Cinderella”. Having quietly, without any advertising, transferred the original own products under the already well-known brand name “Universum”, the director of the factory skillfully used stratagem No. 21 (Chen 2, S. 220).

Some products from the People's Republic of China remained unnoticed by foreign traders at the beginning of the “opening period”, that is, in the 1980s, despite their good quality. Eventually, Chinese manufacturers realized what was wrong: it was the packaging that was outdated or unattractive. Faceless packaging did not interfere with goods on the domestic Chinese market under the conditions of a state planned economy. In the global market, however, success could not be achieved with the old packaging. Once Chinese manufacturers realized this, they began using new, attractive packaging for their products and achieved much-coveted sales success in the world market (Yu 1994, p. 171 ff.).

US economic pioneer William Boeing (1881-1956) soared to success with his Boeing Airplane Company after the US entered World War I in 1917, with the Navy ordering him 50 seaplanes. However, with the end of the war, orders from the government also ceased. The future looked bleak. Retaining the military aircraft segment, he, in order not to give up all chances in the market to competitors, successfully shifted his main focus to the construction of commercially used civil aircraft and also joined the delivery of airmail (CM, S. 1225 ff.). Such a timely shift of the center of gravity from a continuing unprofitable sector to a new business sector that generates profit, as well as the careful development of behavioral options in the event of the occurrence of various future scenarios, are also considered an application of stratagem No. 21 (Chen 1, S. 221 f.; Wee, S 169 f.).

Stratagem Prevention

There is no need to let yourself be carried away by any images that your opponent persistently pays attention to.

Risk when using a stratagem

If the “skin” is too inconspicuous and does not attract attention with its golden shine, the user of the stratagem will not go unnoticed.

Examples

Rescue bankruptcy

In the People's Republic of China, even a major daily newspaper expressed regret that the authorities resorted to the "Cicada sheds its golden skin" stratagem to free state-owned enterprises from their debt obligations. They forced such enterprises to unexpectedly declare bankruptcy and then registered them under a different name. This made it difficult to collect the debts of the disappeared enterprise (RR, 1997, 20.08, S. 9). What in China should be achieved with the help of stratagem No. 21, in the West can be achieved in the “usual” legal way, if we are not talking about delaying the bankruptcy procedure or fraudulent bankruptcy. The use of stratagem No. 21 here is to a certain extent legalized and regulated. Thus, in the USA, WorldCom, which collapsed in a noisy accounting scandal, emerged from bankruptcy proceedings on April 20, 2004 under the new name MCI. During the almost two-year rehabilitation under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Law, the books of accounts for 2000-2002 were corrected. by 73.7 billion dollars. Debts amounting to about $35 billion. were written off. Most creditors received 36% of their claims in the form of new shares and bonds. The shareholders, who at the peak of stock exchange euphoria declared $180 billion their property, were left with practically nothing. From the very beginning, MCI had debts of only $5.5 billion. (NZZ, 2004, 21.04, S. 21).

Innocence in the breakdown of negotiations

If the Chinese decide not to continue negotiations with their partner, then it may happen that they are making impossible demands, and this leaves the partner with no choice but to break off the negotiations. The Chinese side can thus absolve itself of all responsibility for the failure of the project (Fang, S.270).

Stratagem No. 36

[Timely] escape is best [in the event of an emerging absolutely hopeless situation]

Life always consists not only of victories, but also of a series of many small victories and defeats. Rarely is a war or deal resolved in one “campaign.”

One should strive not only for exclusively tactical victories in individual skirmishes, but for the final strategic victory, which may be preceded by many tactical defeats. He who never “runs away” in a strategic dispute is not a true hero; whoever at times “runs away” with intent is in no way a coward (Chen 2, S. 362). “A good fighter does not hesitate to run away,” said Cao, the son of Cao, an actor in the era of the Three Empires (220-280). Only he who can lose can also win (Yu 2003, p. 183). In any case, “waiting” and “escape” must be carefully balanced, and the timing of the possible “escape” must be very well chosen (Chen 1, S. 365).

Stubbornness can lead to a dead end. If a hopeless situation clearly looms on the horizon, then you need to find salvation in time by fleeing, instead of uselessly exhausting your strength. In the worst case, “flight” results in escape (Yu 2003, p. 178). More skillfully, of course, the stratagem is used in the form of a timely, systematic change of tactical or strategic goal (Zhou 1992, p. 114; Yu 2003, p. 178). Thanks to a timely retreat before a competitor that was invincible at that time, it is possible, firstly, to preserve one’s strength and, secondly, to have the maximum number of trade agreements in the future, as well as the possibility of a return. To be able to use this stratagem if necessary, you need to take care of an escape route along which you can retreat at any time. The place where the departure will take place must be well prepared in advance.

Retreat Stratagem; stratagem of course change; escape stratagem

The stratagem is also used without a direct opponent, in the face of a task that exceeds one’s own strength. At the moment of greatest success before the inevitable fall, it can be used to further gain the field of action. In addition, it can be used when there is nothing left to win, but there is a lot to lose; when nothing can be done so as not to expose yourself to danger, but take care in advance that, if necessary, you can get out of a difficult situation and not incur liability.

Stratagem for winning the distance

You must also always be prepared for business decline. When choosing business models, you need to assume in advance that they may become outdated and “run away” from you in the direction of profitable areas of business. In sensitive cases, you should always have open escape routes and a backup key. Statements about the future or any other unclear conditions should be formulated in such a way that you cannot be taken at your word. That said, along with stratagem #20, “Muddying the waters to catch fish [lacking a clear vision]” (using vague expressions), the relationship stratagem can also help: dual behavior “both... and”, and prophetic statements can help expand in the future scope and avoid dead ends. If you make yourself clear but then contradict your own statement or have to claim that you were misunderstood, then this is a stupid joke that should be avoided.

Stratagem range

In business, the content of stratagem No. 36 involves the timely withdrawal of firms from burdensome areas to a new field of activity or the transition of firm owners who believe that a decline in their business will soon come into private life (Chen 2, S. 365). This stratagem also includes the timely formulation of the task of removing tactics that are no longer suitable or any obsolete products. Further, stratagem No. 36 recommends avoiding confrontation with a competitor where it is difficult to oppose its presence, and instead, in those market segments in which the competitor has weaknesses, building your own point in the market with original products (Zhou 1992, p. 114). In the United States after World War II, breweries such as Heinecken managed to move away from the mainstream beer market, which was dominated by market leaders, into undiscovered market sectors and take leading positions, for example, in beer imports (Yao, S. 293 ff. ). If entering the market turns out to be difficult, then it is better to exit it for the time being. This has already been demonstrated by Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC). At the end of the 1960s. KFC tried to penetrate the Asian market through Hong Kong, but Hong Kong was not yet ready to accept a fast food chain from the United States. Instead of digging into Hong Kong, KFC left the city, intending to repeat its attempt in Asia some time later, this time in Singapore. Here KFC was luckier. Based on its experiences in Hong Kong and Singapore, Kentucky Fried Chicken no longer marketed its products as fast food but marketed them as a symbol of a new lifestyle. Success in Singapore enabled the chain's re-entry into the Hong Kong market, and today KFC has a strong presence in the People's Republic of China (Wee, p. 287).

Attempts to give a bribe can be avoided by not simply tactlessly offering money, but by finding alternatives that make sense within the framework of public relations, such as samples of one’s own products instead of some gifts, scholarships in foreign universities, participation in advanced training courses in Western the parent company, etc. When such benefits are provided, this is always done only in forms in which, from a legal and ethical point of view, everything is reliable and in case of failure there is always a way to retreat.

For failing firms, the use of stratagem No. 36 may mean termination or merger with another firm (Yu 1994, S. 314 f.).

Stratagem No. 36 corresponds to the inclusion of clauses in the fine print of, for example, an insurance contract, which relieve the insurance company of various payment obligations.

French President Jacques Chirac is an expert in “escaping” complex issues. When a journalist asked him at a press reception about the vain politician Sarkozy*, he looked at the neckline of her dress and replied: “You have a very beautiful necklace.” When the lady continued to insist: “Yes, but Sarkozy?” - Chirac remained adamant: “Is this necklace from the Antilles?” He also repulsed the journalist’s third attempt: “Oh, how beautiful the Antilles are” (Der Spiegel, 2004, No. 5, S. 157). Chirac's successful implementation of stratagem No. 36 was helped by stratagem No. 27.

Stratagem Prevention

As a legislator, the state should take care of a legal order that would not force the economy to “run away” in terms of taxes and other senses. If during negotiations the opposite side uses this stratagem, then there is no need to be afraid of this, but one should direct one’s further actions not towards “escape”, but towards the supposed intention of the opposite side behind it. You can tell the opposing party from the very beginning that they must communicate everything honestly in order to prevent the use of stratagem No. 36. Contracts need to eliminate any escape routes that the opponent could use due to unclear wording (stratagem No. 20).

Risk when using a stratagem

“Running” may be premature and result in missed opportunities.

Example

“Sorry, I have other things to do.”

In July 1984, a Chinese delegation negotiated with a representative of a Tunisian company about the construction of a fertilizer plant in a very favorable location near Qinghuangdao harbor. After long, sluggish negotiations, in October 1984, a third party became involved - the chairman of the board of a Kuwaiti company. He was an experienced and energetic man. After listening to information about the achieved results of the Sino-Tunisian negotiations during the first meeting of the negotiations, he resolutely stated: “Everything that has been discussed so far is no good, negotiations must begin again.” Both the Chinese and Tunisian sides were stunned. Only 200 thousand dollars were spent on studying the issue, and more than ten experts worked for three months. The new development of negotiations made no sense. But no one dared to say this directly to the Kuwaiti’s face. His authority was very high, because in the Kuwaiti hierarchy, only the Minister of the Oil Industry was above him. In addition, he was the chairman of an international organization for the production of fertilizers and had a company that he represented, and he also owned a large number of shares in Tunisian companies. The atmosphere in the negotiation room was unbearable. Finally, a representative of the local Chinese authorities stood up and said: “For the construction of this plant, we have provided a magnificent site located near the harbor. Many joint ventures sought to obtain the right to use this piece of land. We turned them all down. If now, at the proposal of the Kuwaiti chairman of the board, the project is delayed indefinitely, we will have no choice but to give the plot of land to others. Sorry, I have other things to do. I hereby announce my withdrawal from the negotiations.” After that, the Chinese took his folder and left. The Chinese official rushed after him and tried to persuade him to return to the meeting room. But he smiled slyly and said: “I’m not leaving, I’ll just hide in another office. I am confident that the next round of negotiations will go smoothly." Within half an hour, a minor Chinese official rushed over and told a local government representative waiting in the next office that everything had changed for the better. The disputed piece of land pleased the Kuwaiti chairman of the board. He definitely wants to assign it to the project.

As the representative of the local government had expected, the negotiations now went like clockwork and soon ended with the conclusion of an agreement. One Chinese author's conclusion: Stratagem No. 36 can unblock a critical period of negotiations and lead to a softening of the opposing side's position. In any case, the stratagem must be used at the right moment and, if necessary, must be reinforced with an effective bait that forces the opposite side to be more active. They are, rather, stubborn, uncooperative negotiating partners, for whom it is recommended to apply stratagem No. 36. Stratagem No. 36 should not be applied to a benevolent negotiating partner. When using stratagem No. 36 in negotiations, you need to think beyond the use of the stratagem and think about what measures to take next. This way you will keep power in your hands. Of course, using Stratagem No. 36 may fail and actually lead to a breakdown in negotiations. Whether you take such a risk needs to be carefully considered in advance (Yu 1994, S. 317 ff.).

ISSUES OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

ZOMIA: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR ESCAPE FROM THE STATE* (1)

J. Scott

Faculty/Program of Agricultural Studies Yale University 208209, New Haven, CT 06520-8209, USA

This publication is an abridged translation (2) of the first chapter of James Scott's book The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), published in the Yale Agrarian Studies series. It continues the line of reasoning begun by Scott in “The Good Intentions of the State: Why and How Projects to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed”: the central task of the state is the control of territories and citizens, so mobile, self-governing communities are abhorrent to the idea of ​​nation-building. Scott proposes to take a different look at the history of mankind that we are used to (which focuses exclusively on state institutions in all sorts of formats), taking Southeast Asia as an example and drawing a lot of historical and country analogies.

Key words: Zomia, flight from the state, civilization, barbarism, sedentary lifestyle, self-governing communities.

Throughout human history, beginning with agrarian “civilizations,” the opposition between state expansion and self-governing communities has been of little concern to scientists. But if we deviate a little from generally accepted models and use historical lenses that are more optically stronger than the “state-civilization” pair, we will be surprised at how ubiquitous it is and how rapidly it has developed. Homo Sapiens appeared about 200 thousand years ago and about 50 thousand years ago populated Southeast Asia, where the first settlements arose in the first millennium BC as a small darkening on the historical landscape - local and almost imperceptible. Just before our era, which covers no more than one percent of human history, the local social landscape consisted of very small autonomous clans, which occasionally

* Translation from English by Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Associate Professor I.V. Trotsuk.

united for joint hunting, holidays, battles, trade and peace negotiations. Nothing like a state existed here, and life without it was considered the normal human condition.

Only the modern state, in its colonial and sovereign incarnations, has acquired the resources to implement that project of governance that was previously only dreamed of by its pre-colonial predecessors - the subjugation of stateless territories and peoples. In fact, this is the last great enclosure in Southeast Asia, which was carried out consistently - albeit very crudely, clumsily and with constant setbacks - throughout the twentieth century. All governments - colonial and independent, communist and neoliberal, populist and authoritarian - sought its completion. The obsession with fencing led to different, but always negative results, apparently because any projects of administrative, economic and cultural standardization, by definition, do not fit into the model of a modern state. According to the logic of the state, such fencing is an attempt to integrate the people, territories and resources of peripheral areas to increase their profitability, i.e. becoming accountable sources of gross national product and export trade. But the inhabitants of the peripheries have always been economically connected with the central territories and world trade: often it was they who produced the most valuable goods for it. However, attempts to incorporate them into the economy of the center were proudly called development, progress, eradication of illiteracy and social integration, although in fact the goal of the state was not to increase the productivity of the peripheries, but to ensure that economic activity there was legislated, taxed, statistically recorded and included confiscation procedure; if it could not meet these criteria, it was replaced by economic forms convenient for the state. Wherever possible, the state forced nomadic, slash-and-burn farmers into a sedentary lifestyle in villages; tried to replace common ownership of land with other institutional forms, more often with private property; nationalized forests and mineral deposits; replaced former polycultural subsistence farms with monoculture agricultural production.

The originality and revolutionary character of this grand enclosure will become apparent if we extend its time frame. Historically, the first states of China and Egypt, India at the end of the reign of Shandra Gupta, Ancient Greece and Rome were very modest from a demographic point of view: they occupied a tiny part of the world landscape, falling within the limits of statistical error in estimating the total population of the Earth. The role of Southeast Asia, where the first states arose only in the middle of our millennium, is insignificant in history and is clearly overestimated in textbooks. Small towns surrounded by walls and moats, surrounded by a few villages, these tiny bastions of social hierarchy and political power were extremely unstable and geographically isolated. For a person who has not tested

full of admiration for the ruins and historical milestones of state building, this space looks like a continuous periphery without any centers - most of the population and territories existed perfectly well without them. These tiny state entities had the only strategic and military advantage - they concentrated human and food resources (for the banal reason of irrigated rice cultivation). As a new political form, they united people who had previously lived outside state institutions: some were attracted by the opportunities for trade, enrichment and social and status growth at the courts of rulers; others, and these were the majority, were captives and slaves captured in battle or bought in slave markets. The “barbarian” periphery nourished the states in two respects: first, it supplied hundreds of goods necessary for the prosperity of these toy cities; secondly, there was a brisk trade in captives - the main labor force of the state at that time. We know for sure that most of the inhabitants of Ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, the first states of the Khmers, Thais, Burmese were slaves, captives and their descendants.

The huge uncontrolled space around microscopic states posed a constant threat to them. Here lived nomadic peoples who were engaged in gathering, animal husbandry, hunting, slash-and-burn agriculture, and fishing and denied state control. The variability of their life practices meant that the agrarian state, based on a sedentary lifestyle, could not count on these territories not subject to it from a financial point of view. Until their inhabitants themselves expressed a desire to trade, their goods were inaccessible to anyone, including because the first states almost always arose in the valleys, and numerous stateless groups lived in geographically inaccessible areas - mountainous, swampy, arid or desert. Even if their goods were recognized as high quality, the dispersion of nomadic peoples and the difficulty of transportation negated the economic benefits: the center and periphery by their location should have become trading partners, but trade was impossible, so it took the form of rare voluntary exchanges. For the state elite, the periphery, perceived as hordes of “barbarian tribes,” also posed a threat. Rarely, but very memorable (remember the Mongols, Huns, Ottomans) armed nomads swept away states and rulers. Stateless tribes often attacked the settlements of farmers, sometimes imposing tribute on them, following the example of the state, which needed a sedentary lifestyle to “facilitate the collection of taxes.” But the main and constant reason for the threat from the ungovernable periphery was the temptation to have a life other than in the state. The founders of the first states took away arable land from farmers, asking them to either become citizens or get out. Those who chose the second option became the first political refugees, joining groups that remained outside the sphere of influence of the state. Whenever it expanded its borders, residents of formerly peripheral areas found themselves in the same dilemma.

When the state permeates everywhere and seems inevitable, it is easy to forget that for most of human history, life within the state, outside it, or in some buffer zone was a matter of choice that could be changed. Prosperous, peaceful states attracted more and more people who found many advantages in them - this is the dominant civilizational narrative, according to which savage barbarians, enchanted by the grandeur of just kingdoms, became their citizens. But this narrative misses two important facts: first, many, if not most, inhabitants of the first states were not free, but enslaved; secondly, citizens had a habit of fleeing cities. Life in the city meant taxes, military service, corvee, and often easement - this is the basis of the state and its military power. When the burden of these obligations turned out to be excessive, people fled to the periphery or to another state. Famines and epidemics occurred frequently; the first states were military machines, shedding rivers of blood from their citizens, who therefore sought to avoid conscription, military raids and devastation. That is why states squeezed out no less population than they absorbed, and in the event of wars, droughts, epidemics or rebellions, they simply vomited it out. A state is not something created once and for all: archaeological finds on the site of former capitals, which quickly flourished and were wiped out in the blink of an eye by wars, epidemics, famine or natural disasters, speak of long periods of creation and collapse of states, and not about their timeless sustainability. People lived either in states or without them, and “statelessness” was cyclical and reversible.

The alternation of periods of construction and destruction of states led to the formation of a periphery, which consisted mainly of nomads. This “fragmented territory,” where fragments of state building and political rivalry were united willy-nilly, gradually turned into a zone of mixing ethnic groups and languages. The expansion and collapse of states replenished it with refugees who sought safe shelter and a new life here. Most of the mountain ranges of Southeast Asia are just such a “fragmentation zone.” Similar zones arose wherever the expansion of states, empires, the slave trade, wars, along with natural disasters forced people to seek refuge in inaccessible areas: in the Amazon, in the highlands of Latin America and Africa, in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The distinctive features of all “fragment zones” are geographical inaccessibility and diversity of languages ​​and cultures.

This interpretation of the periphery sharply contrasts with the official versions of civilizational development, according to which backward and naive barbarian tribes gradually became part of developed, more culturally advanced, prosperous states. In reality, many “barbarians” preferred to distance themselves from the state - this circumstance introduces a new component of political action into the previously benign historical picture. Most residents of the periphery consciously settle here

flowed, and therefore they cannot be considered relics of social formations that have sunk into oblivion. The daily existence, social organization, territorial settlement and many elements of the culture of the peripheries are far from archaic and deliberately designed to prevent absorption by nearby states and the formation of similar power structures. “Avoidance” and “prevention” permeate all the life practices and ideology of the periphery, being a “state effect”, therefore the inhabitants of the periphery are “conscious barbarians”: they conduct mutually beneficial trade with the cities, carefully avoiding their political influence.

If we recognize that “barbarism” is not a residual phenomenon, but a conscious choice of a place and way of life, a social structure to maintain independence, then the generally accepted version of the evolution of human civilization is shattered. Its temporal periodization is from gathering to slash-and-burn agriculture (or cattle breeding), then to sedentary and irrigation agriculture; in parallel - from nomadism to small arable lands cleared in forests, then to hamlets, villages, cities and metropolitan centers - reinforces the sense of superiority of the lowland states. But what if each of these hypothetical “stages” is actually a different type of opposition to the state? And peoples consciously choose “primitive” forms of sociality in order to keep the state at a respectful distance from themselves? Then the civilizational discourse of the lowland states and many historians is nothing more than an arrogant linking of statehood with civilization and the groundless declaration of stateless peoples as primitive. Almost all the characteristics with which the population of the peripheries are stigmatized - territorial mobility, slash-and-burn agriculture, a mobile social structure, heterodoxy, egalitarianism and even the lack of writing - do not indicate their primitiveness and civilizational backwardness. In the long-term historical perspective, these are ways of avoiding “capture” by the state or its formation, i.e. the political choices of stateless people in a world of states that both fascinate and frighten.

It was difficult for residents of the periphery to be drawn into the clearly regulated monetary relations of wage labor and settled agriculture. In this sense, “civilization” did not appeal to them: they could enjoy all the benefits of trade without the routine, subordination and restrictions imposed on citizens. The scale of resistance to the state led to the golden age of slavery on the coasts of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans in Southeast Asia: the local population was driven en masse from territories where their labor was declared illegal or useless, and transported to colonies and plantations to cultivate the most profitable for landowners and the state. cultural treasuries (tea, cotton, sugar, coffee, etc.). The first step in the enclosure process was enslavement - the forcible capture and removal of the population from stateless territories, where people for the most part led an independent (and happy!) life, to where the state needed their labor. The final stages of fencing

The revolutions that occurred in Europe in the 19th century, and in Southeast Asia at the end of the 20th century, mark such a radical change in the relations of states with their peripheries that they actually fall out of our scheme. During this period, “fencing” is not the movement of stateless people to controlled territories, but the colonization of the periphery - turning it into a manageable, economically profitable zone. The internal, often unconscious, logic of fencing is the final deliverance from stateless spaces. This truly imperial project became possible only thanks to modern technologies that shorten distances (all-weather roads, bridges, rail and air travel, modern weapons, telegraph, telephone, information technology, etc.), which were discussed in Southeast Asia even after 1950. pointless...

The nation state, as, in fact, the only possible option for sovereignty in the twentieth century is perceived with extreme hostility by stateless peoples. In this model, state power is a monopoly on the use of violence, which extends over the entire territory of the country; beyond its borders, a neighboring sovereign state has a similar right. Today, in principle, large territories and peoples that are not controlled by anyone or torn by the contradictions of several weak powers and are not attributable to anyone’s jurisdiction have disappeared. National states sought to achieve this by expending all available resources: creating militarized border posts, moving loyal populations closer to the borders and replacing “disloyal” ones with them, developing settled agriculture and transport links in border areas, and maintaining migration records. They realized that previously ignored and considered useless lands, where stateless peoples were forced out, are necessary for a developed capitalist economy because they are rich in natural resources - oil, iron ore, copper, lead, uranium, coal, bauxite, raw materials for the aerospace and electronics industries, hydroelectric power stations, biological resources and protected areas. Areas that previously attracted only gold miners and slave traders are experiencing a new round of truly gold rushes thanks to the obsessive desire of states to tightly control their territory down to the most remote borders and all its inhabitants.

This control is impossible without an appropriate cultural policy. Basically, the periphery along the state borders of mainland Southeast Asia is inhabited by people whose linguistic and cultural practices differ sharply from the inhabitants of the central regions, which, according to states, gives rise to a chaos of multiple identities, hotbeds of political protest and separatism. Weak states allowed, or rather tolerated, a certain level of autonomy if they had no other choice. If they had sufficient resources, they tried to control the periphery by stimulating or demanding its linguistic, cultural and religious alignment with the main population of the country, for example, in Thailand, the Lahu people were forced to speak Thai, get an education, accept Buddhism and be loyal to the monarchy. Pa-

in parallel, a policy of demographic absorption was pursued: in a situation of lack of land, people from the plains moved to the mountains, where they recreated their usual forms of settlements and agriculture and over time began to demographically dominate the scattered and small local residents... The goal of internal colonization was the consistent and large-scale eradication of the local diversity of languages, nationalities, economic practices, forms of land ownership, types of hunting, gathering and forestry, religious beliefs, etc. The state considered the forced rapprochement of the periphery with the center as progress and the development of civilization through the spread of linguistic, economic and religious practices of the dominant ethnic group (Han, Kinkh, Burmese, Thai) (3).

Constant movements between plains and mountains, their causes, features and consequences - this is the subject of my consideration. After all, many city residents are “ex-mountain” inhabitants, and mountain residents are “ex-plain”: a change of residence did not exclude the possibility of return. In some circumstances, people distanced themselves from the state, in others they wanted (or were forcibly forced) to become its citizens, only to slip out of the clutches of the state again after a few centuries due to its collapse or their own flight. Such territorial and status transformations inevitably influenced the ethnic identification (I am a supporter of radical constructivism) of the “mountain tribes” of Southeast Asia. In fact, these are refugees who settled in the mountainous areas over the past fifteen hundred years, leaving Burma, Thailand, Siam, and the Han Empire during the expansionist policies of the Tiang, Yuan, Ming and Qin dynasties. Here they could also change their place of residence, being forced out by other, stronger groups or a new round of state expansion, so their current economic and cultural practices, place and type of settlement are nothing more than the “state effect.” This version of history contradicts the generally accepted one, according to which the population of the mountains are the descendants of primitive people left here by those who descended from the mountains and created civilization... The generally accepted interpretation of mountain “tribes”, like modern folklore, sees in them relics of previous stages human history... The “exactly one way and no other” version of history considers the lowland culture to be later, developed, civilized, having left everything bad behind, in a tribal system, which terribly distorts the facts: lowland and mountain communities developed simultaneously and interconnectedly, literally following on the heels of each other. Mountain dwellers have always had contact with cities directly or through coastal trade routes; city ​​residents have always interacted with the stateless periphery: Deleuze and Guattari called these contacts “local mechanisms of gangs, marginals and minorities to protect the rights of isolated communities in opposition to state authorities,” thanks to which “in an incomprehensible way they remained completely free from the state.”

Exactly the same relationships developed between states and nomads. Pierre Clastres has convincingly shown that the supposedly “primitive” Indians of South America

The Ricks are not ancient tribes that failed to invent sedentary agriculture and the state, but former peasants who abandoned a sedentary lifestyle after the conquest of America (demographic collapse as a result of new pandemics and forced labor in the colonies also played a role). Migrations and life practices helped them keep the state at a distance. In the steppes of Central Asia, the oldest nomadic tribes on the planet also formerly practiced settled agriculture, but abandoned it for political and demographic reasons. Owen Lattimore argues that nomadic pastoralism arose after sedentary agriculture, when peasants "separated from rural communities". States and nomadic peoples (these supposed failures of social evolution) arose simultaneously - like twins, bound by close, irreducible ties, albeit of cruel enmity.

According to Gellner, political independence is always a choice, not a given. In relation to groups that deliberately left the cities or remained "outside the state", he uses the expression "marginal tribalism" to emphasize their political uncertainty: "many tribes know about the opportunity ... to become part of a centralized state ... but deliberately refuse it or they resist it fiercely. Such are the tribes in the Atlas Mountains: even before the era of the modern state, they deliberately became dissidents... "Marginal" tribalism... is a type of tribalism that has developed on the borders of states, because someone does not accept subordination and seeks to avoid centralized authority, in which mountains and deserts help it. Such tribalism is politically marginal and understands what exactly it is giving up. " In the Maghreb, as in Zomia, the divide between state-controlled zones and marginal, autonomous ones is geographical, ecological and political in nature: "narrow gorges and mountains are the end of state control (bled el-makhazen) and the beginning of dissidence (bled es-siba).”

The example of the Berbers is significant for two reasons. First, Gellner demonstrated that the line of demarcation between the Arab and Berber populations is not a civilizational or religious one, but a political one, separating citizens from non-state-controlled tribes; and history knows the transitions across this line. The question arises: to what extent is political status ethnically predetermined, i.e. depends on fundamental human differences rather than conscious choice? The answer is: those who, for whatever reason, sought to avoid “nationalization” “tribalized” themselves - ethnicity and clan system arose when sovereignty and taxation ended. The periphery was intimidated and stigmatized by official rhetoric precisely because it was outside the zone of influence of the state and represented an example of successful opposition to it, very attractive to potential political refugees. Secondly, Gellner's analysis is noteworthy as a welcome different view, correcting the official state version - the "view from the plains" on the "barbarian periphery" as a fragment of the past that will sooner or later absorb the light of Arab civilization. In Southeast Asia and the Maghreb

it is popular because the ungoverned periphery was gradually replaced by nation-states in the last century.

But still, the idea that the enlightened center, like a magnet, attracted and united peripheral people is wrong: life outside the state was simpler and more attractive; historical facts speak of evolutionary fluctuations in the political state, and not of linear development. Of course, avoidance of the state is not the ultimate truth, but a fact that is not widely covered in the civilizational narrative, despite its historical importance... The semantic identity of the concepts of “being civilized” and “being a citizen” is not questioned, from which the antonymity of “citizenship” and “self-government” follows. The classical states of Southeast Asia and the Middle East were surrounded by stateless, self-governing tribes living in mountainous areas, swamps, swamps, mangroves, labyrinths and river deltas. This marginal territory was an important trading partner for the cities, a refuge from state institutions, a zone of relative equality and intense territorial mobility, a supplier of slaves and citizens for nearby states, and a source of eco-cultural identity that mirrored that of the citizens of surrounding states.

So, although my attention is focused on the Zomia highlands, I am speaking generally about relationships without state and state spaces. Zo-mia is a complex mountain refuge for refugees from lowland state-building projects: its inhabitants came to these lands and stayed here, wanting to be beyond the reach of the state. The concept of “Southeast Asia” as a designation for a group of states within given geographical boundaries does not work here. Over two millennia, Zomia has been inhabited by countless migrants from neighboring countries, many of whom were formerly settled farmers. They fled to the west and south from the Han Empire and Tibet (Thai, Yao (Mien), Hmong (Miao), Lahu, Akha (Hani)), to the north from Thailand and Burma for political, cultural and military reasons. Zomia was not inhabited by some scattered tribes - the ethnic differentiation and identity of the mountain peoples varied over time, but always reflected their attitude to state power. I would venture to suggest that there have never been “tribes” here in the full sense of the word: the life and economic practices of mountain peoples should be considered as a protest against any attempts to absorb them into the state (the social structure and patterns of living are also a political choice “against” the state; egalitarianism is analogous to the Berber principle “separate so as not to obey”). And these are not sociological or cultural abstract schemes: actual rules of inheritance, genealogical branches, leadership patterns, household structure and even literacy levels were purposefully designed in the periphery to prevent its absorption by the state.

An adequate understanding of their own history by the population of Southeast Asia is blocked by its “state” version, which is quite justified in relation to

of the last fifty years, but grossly distorts the essence of earlier periods. Most of the region's history was without states: they were short-lived, had little control outside the royal courts, and were unable to systematically extract resources (including labor) from their subjects. Interregnums occurred more often than periods of kingdoms: in the pre-colonial era, the pandemonium of tiny principalities allowed the population to easily change their place of residence and loyalty, based on considerations of their own benefit, to calmly move to zones not controlled by anyone or lying at the intersection of the interests of several powers. The states that emerged in Southeast Asia constantly changed their political course from caring for citizens in order to attract new subjects to enslavement in order to squeeze the maximum amount of labor and harvest out of them. Labor is the key to everything: even if the state's income was provided by trade, it still depended on the ability of the government to mobilize human resources to maintain and protect profitable trade routes. Periodically, states degenerated into despotism. Geography (the foundation of people's freedom) became a criterion for testing the strength of power: citizens, crushed by tax, military and labor obligations, fled to the mountains or nearby states (rather than staging uprisings). The vicissitudes of wars and political rivalries, crop failures and royal delusions of grandeur determined the unpredictability and inevitability of state-building crises.

Why does the history of states so persistently displace the history of peoples? In short, the reason I see is that even the weak and short-lived first states, created on the model of Indian principalities, left behind a huge number of artifacts. Agrarian settlements were not structurally more complex than societies of foragers and slash-and-burn farmers, but they produced a lot of garbage and archaeological ruins: and the larger the pile of stones you left behind, the more significant your role in history. Dispersed, mobile and egalitarian peoples, with little concern for their own sophistication or the development of trade, although often more numerous, rarely receive historical mention simply because they scattered their artifacts over vast areas. The same can be said about written evidence: almost everything we know about the first states of Southeast Asia is gleaned from “documents” - land deeds, official chronicles, court records, registers of taxes, duties and church donations: and The more impressive the text trail you leave behind, the more noticeable your place in history. But it also gives rise to distortions: the traditional designations of history in the Burmese and Thai languages ​​(uaga"šn and porope8aayoap) are translated as “the lives of rulers” or “chronicles of kings,” so it is difficult to reconstruct the “worlds” of non-elite groups, even those who lived at court, from them. are mentioned in documents of the past only in the form of numbers (so many workers subject to military service, taxpayers, rice farmers, citizens paying taxes) and acquire the status of historical actors only in exceptional cases of violation of the social order (for example, rebellion). that the peasants made every effort not to end up in historical chronicles...

The sovereign states of Southeast Asia are responsible for new historical mystifications: as the ethnic and geographical heirs of earlier powers, they have an interest in exaggerating their glory, integrity and beneficence. The history of classical states has been distorted to identify protonations and proto-nationalism as weapons in the fight against external and internal enemies... The result is a historical tale about the ancient origins of the nation, which carefully camouflages the inconsistency of history and the fluidity of pre-existing identities. Such extremely unrealistic “fairy tales” are intended to convince of the naturalness of progress and the need for a state in general and a national one - in particular, although most of the chronology they cover passed without states and their “similarities”: if any arose, then as personal, tiny and fragmented fiefdoms rulers who rarely outlived their founders. Their cosmology and ideology extended much further than actual political control, so it is important to distinguish the “strong hand” of the state from its economic and symbolic influence. Pre-colonial states could rely on a very small radius of 300 km around the royal court to obtain crops and labor, and only in the dry season. The actual economic reach was wider, but depended on voluntary exchanges: the higher the value and smaller the weight and size of the goods (compare silk and precious stones with coal or grain), the greater the economic influence of the power. The symbolic influence of the state - regalia, titles, appearance, cosmology - extended very far in the form of ideas that even the most rebellious mountain dwellers internalized. If strict control was rather the dream of the rulers of empires, then their influence on population movements and their worldview was truly great. Perhaps we should replace “imperial dreams” with a model of history in which long periods of normative (institutional) and normalized (ordered) statelessness will be occasionally interrupted by short dynastic reigns, each of which, dissolving into history, left behind a new portion of royal dreams?

Large states were extremely unstable; their building “bricks” were not distinguished by constancy, constantly splitting, moving, merging and being reborn; households and individuals also rarely led a regular life - a village could survive for half a century, but people left and came, their linguistic and ethnic identification changed radically. Demography played a major role in these processes: the population density in Southeast Asia was 1,600 people (this is one-sixth Indian and one-seventh Chinese figures); and the openness of borders blocked the excessive claims of states - in the event of epidemics, famine, heavy burdens of taxes, labor and military conscription, intergroup conflicts, religious schism, dishonor, scandal, or simply wanting to change their fate, households and entire settlements were easily removed. Membership in any social formation was fluid - environmental and geographical differences differed in constancy.

Chinese criteria for a preferred location: a non-arid valley with a navigable river or trade routes could be abandoned, but repopulated as soon as conditions permitted. Candidates for the status of creators of the state could only rely on very unstable building “material”: the absence of an ambitious and strong leader or the instability of the political system instantly led to the collapse of the state. In this situation, a clear and consistent version of history is possible: the constitutive elements of the political order have their own chronology, have, albeit crude, logic of formation, connection and disintegration, demonstrate a certain degree of autonomy in relation to previous and modern states - in fact, they are unstable, but permanent characteristics of the social landscape, as opposed to rare and ephemeral empires. States are “accidental” because they are “complex interweavings of contractual relations”: any threat causes “elements of the system to fly apart in different directions.”

The main problem of the stateless history of Southeast Asia is the designation of the conditions necessary for the unification and disintegration of elements of the political order: “in fact, we are dealing with molecules that sometimes form vague configurations and are just as easily separated; even their names are not logical and definite.” The instability of “molecules” is inconvenient for anthropologists and historians; imagine how this is a serious problem for kings, colonial authorities and modern officials. The rulers of states find it almost impossible to control if people are on the move, have no stable social patterns and permanent residence, their leaders are short-lived, their life practices are changeable, their preferences are few, and their linguistic and ethnic identities are fluid. But this is the whole point: such an economic, political and cultural organization is nothing more than a strategy of avoiding incorporation into the state, most effectively implemented in the mountain ranges...

NOTES

(1) Zomia Scott refers to the “fragmented” “buffer” interstate zone, a geographically inaccessible, mountainous region the size of Europe, which includes territorial patches of seven Asian countries and whose population, distinguished by the diversity of languages ​​and cultures, has skillfully evaded all “traps” for centuries. surrounding states seeking to “nationalize” it. Today Zomia is a vanishing, but still "the largest surviving region in the modern world whose inhabitants are not absorbed into nation-states... although not so long ago such self-governing communities made up the majority of humanity" (Translator's Note).

(2) The first chapter of the book is fundamental for understanding Scott's ideological plan: it marks all the components of his concept of Zomia, each of which is further devoted to a separate chapter. Scott's book is full of specific examples and vivid illustrations; it is interesting to read due to its factual clarity, so a literal translation of the first chapter would exceed all permissible volumes of scientific publication in the journal, and the translation presented is of an abstract nature, indicating only the substantive and evaluative accents of the text (Translator's Note).

(3) The translation of the first chapter was shortened primarily due to footnotes and illustrative material that were uninformative for the Russian reader. Two sections of the first chapter are not presented in the text: “The Great Mountain Kingdom, (or) Zomia, (or) the Border Territories of Mainland Southeast Asia” and “Zones of Rescue from the State.” The first describes the geographical location, history of the formation of the name, research interpretations, social and political structure, forms of cultural and linguistic protest and autonomy in Zomia - the largest stateless mountainous area in the world today, stretching from Sichuan province to the northeastern borders of Cambodia , home to 80 to 100 million people from hundreds of ethnic groups who have fundamentally refused to participate in any state-building projects. The second of the untranslated paragraphs examines the historical stages of the transformation of Zomia into a zone of salvation from the state in its most varied formats, starting with the Han Empire, and the development of social institutions here - agriculture, status hierarchy, ethnic and linguistic differentiation; “analogues” of Zomia in other countries, including Russia, are given (Translator’s Note).

LITERATURE

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ZOMIA: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES OF FLIGHT FROM THE STATE

Faculty/Program of Agrarian Studies Yale University

Yale University, Box 208209, New Haven, CT 06520-8209, U.S. A.

This publication is a synopsis-translation of the first chapter from the book by James Scott "The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia" (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), which came out in the "Yale Agrarian Studies" series. It continues the line of argument started by Scott in his work "Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed": the central task of the state is to control the territories and the citizens, this is why the mobile , self-governing communities are opposed to the very idea of ​​national unity. Scott suggests that we take a different look at the conventional history of mankind (focusing exclusively on national institutions in all possible formats), taking the example of South-East Asia and drawing numerous historical and regional analogies.

Key words: Zomia, flight from the state, civilization, barbarism, settled way of life, self-governing communities.

, Comments to the entry Coping strategies disabled

Coping strategies are ways of interacting with a difficult, stressful situation. In a difficult situation, a person experiences stress and tension. This is unpleasant, and therefore the person wants to get out of this situation as soon as possible. Coping strategies are habitual schemes with the help of which a particular person is used to getting out of difficult situations.

Coping can be problem-oriented and emotion-oriented. Problem-oriented coping is aimed at changing the situation, emotion-oriented coping is aimed at regulating the emotional state caused by a stressful situation.

In addition to the concept of “coping strategy,” there is also the concept of coping style. Coping style refers behavior to one of three types of response to a threatening situation. Like animals, humans typically use three styles of responding to threat: freeze, flight, and attack. In terms of human behavior, this would be capitulation, avoidance, and overcompensation.

When surrendering, a person accepts an unpleasant experience as something irresistible that can only be accepted, and behaves in accordance with this idea. With avoidance, a person tries not to get into certain situations that are difficult for him. With overcompensation, a person behaves as if he is not at all or cannot get into the difficult situation that he is afraid of.

Examples of reactions according to each of the coping styles in a situation where a person is afraid of criticism from others.

1) Coping style “Surrender”: a person goes to a party where he feels very uncomfortable and constrained, and thinks that he is such a constrained and uninteresting person, and nothing can be done about it.

2) “Avoidance” coping style: a person avoids parties and any social situations where he might feel awkward.

3) “Overcompensation” coping style: a person goes to a party and tries to become the life of the party there, talks and laughs loudly, drinks alcohol, trying to hide his discomfort from himself and other people.

Each coping style has several coping strategies with the help of which the desire to avoid a situation, come to terms with it, or compensate for it is realized.

The Ways of Coping Questionnaire is the most successful technique for identifying preferred coping behavior. The questionnaire was standardized and adapted in the laboratory of clinical psychology of the Institute. V.M. Bekhterev. It consists of 50 questions. The questionnaire is based on the Lazarus coping test and is its Russian-language adaptation.

The test determines preference for one or more of eight strategies for coping with stress.

Coping strategy confrontation involves active activity aimed at changing the situation or responding to the negative emotions associated with it. The preference for this strategy often implies impulsive behavior, hostility, conflict, difficulties in predicting the results of actions, and a focus primarily on relieving emotional tension.

Coping strategy distancing involves emotional withdrawal from the situation, reducing its subjective significance through rationalization, humor, switching attention, etc.

Strategy self-control involves restraining and suppressing emotions, controlling behavior. Typically, this strategy for coping with stress is associated with the desire to hide your feelings from others.

Strategy taking responsibility involves recognizing one’s role in the current situation through self-criticism and self-accusation.

Strategy escape-avoidance– avoidance of the problem in the form of its denial, fantasizing, etc.

Coping strategy problem solving planning involves analyzing the situation, planning your own actions, taking into account past experience and available resources.

Positive revaluation– a strategy for coping with stress, aimed at re-evaluating negative experiences, considering them as a resource for personal growth.

Each strategy can be either adaptive or non-adaptive, depending on the situation and the individual’s resources.